RESURRECTING MOUNT LAUREL: USING TITLE
VIII LITIGATION TO ACHIEVE THE ULTIMATE
MOUNT LAUREL GOAL OF INTEGRATION
Cynthia N. McKee*
This paper will present an as applied challenge to the New Jersey
Fair Housing Act (NJFHA). Specifically, Regional Contribution Agreements (RCAs) will be attacked by use of a disparate impact theory under
the federal Fair Housing Act (Title VIII, also known as the FHA). This
law prohibits discrimination in housing based on race and national origin.
Part I of this paper discusses the findings of the statistical data of Seton
Hall University's Center for Public Service Study, which reveals a disproportionate impact based on race and national origin on persons of low
to moderate income in Mount Laurel housing. Part II includes a history
of the pertinent Mount Laurel decisions and the NJFHA. Part III contains an analysis of Title VIII and related federal case law. Part IV discusses remedies including litigation and changes to the NJFHA.
Recently reported data from a study conducted by the Center for
Public Service at Seton Hall University revealed what many housing advocates intuitively knew existed with respect to Mount Laurel housing:
suburban Mount Laurel housing is overwhelming occupied by Whites,
while urban housing is occupied by Blacks and Latinos.' The Study is of
major importance because for the first time, data was collected and analyzed to determine whether Mount Laurel has been successful in providing economically and racially integrated housing.
This Study provides housing advocates with a vehicle to once again
challenge both judicial and, more importantly, legislative initiatives that
have failed to accomplish the goals that Justice Hall enunciated in Southern Burlington County N.A.A.C.P. v. Township of Mt. Laurel over
twenty years ago. The Study provides statistical proof that New Jersey
still consists of segregated communities where Whites enjoy the good life
" Director, Seton Hall University School of Law Center for Social Justice Fair
Housing Clinic.
See generally NAOMI BAILIN WISH, PH.D. & STEPHEN EISDORFER, ESQ. THE
IMPACT OF MouNT L4UREL INITIATIVES:
AN ANALYSIS OF THE CHARACTERISTICS OF
APPLICANTS AND OCCUPANTS (1996) [hereinafter The Study].
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of suburbia and minorities languish in urban centers where crime is high,
education poor, and the job market lacking. Why is this happening?
And what can be done?
INTRODUCTION

In 1975, the New Jersey Supreme Court embarked upon a journey
that would forever change land use planning in New Jersey. 2 In Mount
Laurel I, the state's highest court struck down the exclusionary zoning
ordinance of a small but developing community.' In so doing, it held
"... that every municipality must, by its land use regulations, presumptively make realistically possible an appropriate variety and choice

of housing."'
Eight years later, in Southern Burlington County N.A.A.C.P. v.
Township of Mt. Laurel (Mount Laurel If), the court, frustrated by mu-

nicipalities' non-compliance 5 , issued an opinion that would "put some
steel" into Mount Laurel L"' While the decision threw the court into
further controversy, it nevertheless forced the Legislature to act.7
The vehement urging of the court and panic of municipalities and
public officials 8 compelled the New Jersey State Legislature to enact the
Fair Housing Act (NJFHA) in 1985. This Act was upheld and praised

2 See Southern Burlington County N.A.A.C.P. v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67
N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713 (1975) [hereinafter Mount Laurel 1].
3 The Court concluded that Mt. Laurel's zoning ordinance was contrary to the general public welfare clause of the New Jersey State Constitution and outside the municipality's zoning power. See id. at 185, 336 A.2d at 730.
4 See id. at 174, 336 A.2d at 724.
5 "Mt. Laurel is not alone; we believe that there is widespread non-compliance with
the constitutional mandate of our original opinion in this case." Southern Burlington
County N.A.A.C.P. v. Township of Mount Laurel, 92 N.J. 158, 199, 456 A.2d 390, 410
(1983) [hereinafter Mount Laurel Ill.
6 "To the best of our ability, we shall not allow it [non-compliance] to continue .... The [constitutional] obligation is to provide a realistic opportunity for housing, not litigation." See id.
7 See Paula A. Franzese, Mount Laurel Ill:The New Jersey Supreme Court's Judicious Retreat, 18 SETON HALL L. RE'. 30, 31 n.6 (1987) (citing Harold A. McDougall,
From Litigation to Legislation to Exclusionary Zoning Law, 22 HARv.C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
623, 625) (1987).
s See Justin M. Monaghan & William Penkethman, Jr., Comment, The FairHousing
Act: Meeting the Mount Laurel Obligation with a Statewide Plan, 9 SETON HALL LEG. J.
585, 592 (1986) ('The Act directs that the preferred means of addressing the fair share
controversies is not through the courts, but via the mediation and review process set forth
in the Act. Further, the Act expresses the Legislature's contempt for the Court invented
builder's remedy.").
9 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-301-334 (West 1996).
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by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Hills Development Co. v. Township
of Bernards (Mount Laurel 111). 10
After twenty years of litigation and legislation, New Jersey still has
not reached the implicit and ultimate goal of Mount Laurel, namely, the
integration of its communities. 1 There still exists in New Jersey communities where the words "Mount Laurel" mean a place on the map
rather than a "realistic opportunity" for an affordable, decent home in a
safe neighborhood where a job and quality education are commonplace.
This paper will discuss using both the federal Fair Housing Act,"
(Title VIII) and the federal courts to resurrect the Mount Laurel doctrine
so that "the realistic oppoitunity" for an affordable home is just thatrealistic.
This paper will also provide a preliminary review of Mount Laurel
cases and NJFHA. While NJFHA has accomplished some good, it has
failed to integrate neighborhoods and, indeed, has perpetuated segregation. This failure creates a Title VIII cause of action against state actors.
Title VIII prohibits discrimination in housing. 3 A major policy
objective of Title VIII is racial integration. 4 Nonetheless, sections of
NJFHA, instead of implementing the Mount Laurel doctrine, actually
perpetuate segregation in violation of Title VIII. Particularly egregious
is NJFHA's allowance of Regional Contribution Agreements (RCAs),
permitting a community to sell up to 50% of their fair share to another
community in the region. 5 This creates a disparate impact based on race
and national origin in violation of Title VIII.
103 N.J. 1,510 A.2d 621 (1986) [hereinafter Mount Laurel III].
t In his concurrence in Mount Laurel 1, Justice Pashman wrote, "[wlith this decision,
the Court begins to cope with the dark side of municipal land use regulation-the use of
the zoning power to advance the parochial interests of the municipality at the expense of
the surrounding region and to establish and perpetuate social and economic segregation."
67 N.J. at 193, 336 A.2d at 735. "The purpose of land use regulation is to create pleasant, well-balanced communities, not to recreate slums in new locations." See id. at 212,
336 A.2d at 745.
12 42 U.S.C. § 3601-3618 (1994 & Supp. 1997).
13 See id.
14 "The reach of the proposed law was to replace the ghettos 'by truly integrated and
10

balanced living patterns." Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 211
(1972) (quoting Senator Mondale, 114 CONG. REc. 3422 (1968)).
's See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-312 (West 1996). Housing region is defined as "a
geographic area of not less than two nor more than four contiguous, whole counties
which exhibit significant social,' economic and income similarities . . . . " N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 52:27D-304(b) (West 1986 & Supp. 1997). Additionally, the Council on Affordable Housing (COAH) adopted a plan that broke the state up into six regions. Monaghan
& Penkethman, Jr., supra note 8, at -594 n.63. Region 1 is Bergen, Passaic, and Hudson
counties; Region 2: Essex, Morris, Sussex, and Union; Region 3: Middlesex, Somerset,
and Warren; Region 4: Monmouth and Ocean; Region 5: Burlington, Camden,
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The concept of disparate impact is quite simple. While a legislative
or administrative action appears neutral on its face, it nevertheless creates
a clear, disproportionate pattern that cannot be explained on any other
ground but race.16 With the use of the recently gathered statistical data,
this paper will show that New Jersey neighborhoods remain segregated
even though it is true that Mount Laurel housing has been built. The data
shows that suburban Mount Laurel housing is substantially occupied by
Whites. By contrast, urban housing is substantially occupied by minorities. The data plainly shows these disproportionate effects as they concern minority groups in New Jersey.
The United States Supreme Court has affirmed the use of statistical
data in proving disparate impact claims.17 Similarly, circuit courts" have
held defendants liable for Title VIII violations by the showing of a disparate impact on a particular racial group, without the need to prove intent.19
While other, less litigious remedies may help solve New Jersey's
integration problem, it is comforting to know that the New Jersey judiciary (as well as the federal judiciary) will act if necessary. As former
Chief Justice Wilentz wrote in Mount Laurel II, "[wie may not build
houses, but we do enforce the Constitution."'

I. THE STUDY
The Study was done to determine the impact and effect of the Mount
Laurel decisions. This Study collected data that was analyzed to ascertain the characteristics of those persons occupying Mount Laurel hous21
ing.
The Study was done to determine whether the anti-exclusionary
zoning initiatives set forth in Mount Laurel I and its progeny have sucGloucester, and Mercer; and Region 6: Atlantic, Cape May, Cumberland, and Salem
counties. See id.
'a See Resident Advisory Board v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 141 (3d Cir. 1977) (citations
omitted) [hereinafter Rizzo].
17 "Where gross statistical disparities can be shown, they alone may in a proper case
constitute prima facie proof of a pattern or practice of discrimination." Hazelwood Sch.
Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 307-08, (1977) (quoting International Bhd. of
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 (1977)).
18 See United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 837 F.2d 1181 (2d Cir. 1987); Rizzo,
564 F.2d at 150; Hanson v. Veterans Administration, 800 F.2d 1281 (5th Cir. 1986);
United States v. City of Parma, 661 F.2d 562, 576 (6th Cir. 1981); Metropolitan Hous.
Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1294 (7th Cir. 1977); United
States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974).
19 See id.
2 Mount Laurel 11, 92 N.J. at 213, 456 A.2d at 417.
21 See WISH & EISDORFER, supra note 1, at 19.
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ceeded in providing housing for low to moderate income people in suburban communities that have excluded certain groups of people through
their zoning practices.' The Study focused on who presently occupies
Mount Laurel housing and whether people of color have had the opportunity to move into suburban Mount Laurel housing.'
The Study used data collected and maintained by the Affordable
This database included apHousing Management Service (AHMS).'
proximately 36,000 applicants for low and moderate income housing and
approximately 7500 additional occupants of such housing during 1988 to
1996.' The Study's results were not surprising.
First, only a very small number of those occupying Mount Laurel
housing actually moved from an urban area to a suburban area. 6 Second,
the study found that Black and Latino applicants are less likely to obtain
housing managed by the AHMS than their White counterparts. 27 Third,
Blacks and Latinos overwhelmingly occupy urban units and Whites
overwhelmingly occupy suburban units.'
Of those housing units that are administered by the AHMS, 81% of
suburban units are occupied by Whites and 85% of urban units are occupied by Blacks or Latinos.' Additionally, of all the households in the
database for past and previous residence based on race and ethnicity, only
15% of previous urban dwellers have moved to the suburbs.'
The Study also provides more glaring statistics. For example, 86%
of Whites who applied for housing previously lived in the suburbs, unlike
86% of Blacks and 80% of Latinos who applied, who lived in urban areas." Additionally, 65% of White occupants who previously lived in uronly 5% of Blacks and only 2%
ban areas moved to the suburbs whereas
of Latinos moved to the suburbs. 2 Of those Black occupants that lived in

22

See id. at l.

(The Study also focused on age, sex, size of household, and disability. For purposes of this paper, only race and ethnicity will be discussed.)
24 See id. at 1. The AHMS is a state agency created by NJFHA established to aid
municipalities and developers in achieving their Mount Laurel obligation. Specifically,
the AHMS sets eligibility requirements and pricing controls for Mount Laurel housing.
See id. at 2.
2 See id. at 1.
23 See id. at 7.

26 See WISH & EisDORFER, supra note 1, at 1.

See
28 See
29 See
30 See
31 See
32 See
27

id.
id. at 2.
id. at 53.
id. at 69.
WISH & EIsDORFER, supra note 1, at 70.
id.
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the suburbs, 21% went back to the cities." Of those Latinos who moved
to the suburbs, almost all remained there.'
Interestingly, although Whites make up almost 70% of incomeeligible households, they only represent approximately 33% of applicants." In contrast, Blacks make up 21% of income-eligible households
and represent 45% of applicants. 6 Latinos represent 4% of incomeeligible households and represent 12% of applicants."
The Study does not address "the why" of these results although it
does state that various reasons are possible."' For the purposes of this
paper, however, the striking statistics offer proof of a prima facie case of
a violation of Title VIII"
II. THE MOUNT LAUREL CASES

In October 1970, Ethel Lawrence,' a resident of Mt. Laurel, heard
the mayor of her town state, "'If you people'-you poor and black people, that is-'can't afford to live in our town, then you'll just have to
leave.'" 4' 1 These words marked the beginning of what would become the
nation's most innovative and controversial case in land use planning and
affordable housing.42

3 See id.
34 See id.
3

See id. at 37.

36 See WISH & EISDORFER, supra note 1, at 38.

See id. at 38-39.
See id. at 71. ("This study does not enable us to distinguish among possible causes
for this phenomenon. It could be individual or group preferences .... Many want to
remain in the municipality in which they currently live .... On the other hand, subtle
discrimination by builders, mortgage lenders, or others could lead to these results.").
3 Racial segregation not only exists in New Jersey but throughout the country.
"Eighty-six percent of suburban Whites live in communities that are less than 1% Black.
Seventy-five present of White Americans live in suburban or rural areas, while more than
50% of Black and Hispanic Americans live in urban areas." James J. Hartnett, Affordable Housing, Exclusionary Zoning, and American Apartheid: Using Title VIII to Foster
Statewide Racial Integration, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 89, 103 (1993).
4o DAviD L. KiRP ET AL., OuR TowN, RACE, HOUSING AND THE SOUL OF SuBURmIA 34 (Rutgers Univ. Press 1995). Mrs. Lawrence was a "devoted mother and good neighbor" who put aside her life, subjected herself to hostility and threats of violence. Like
Rosa Parks who refused to give up her seat on a bus in Montgomery, Alabama, Ethel
Lawrence did what she believed was the right thing to do. This, of course, changed history. See id.
41 KIRP Er AL, supra note 40, at 2.
("Their impact reached far beyond New Jersey, affecting policies
4 See id. at 3.
from Massachusetts to California, as Mount Laurel became the Roe v. Wade of fair
housing, the Brown v. Board of Education of exclusionary zoning." See id.).
3

38
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What made Mount Laurel I so controversial is that the New Jersey
Supreme Court placed an affirmative duty ' on municipalities to provide
an opportunity for the building of low-income housing "at least to the
extent of the municipality's fair share of the present or prospective regional need therefor."" The court imposed this duty because it concluded that exclusionary zoning practices designed to keep
"undesirables" out were violative of the general welfare clause of state's
constitution.'
Justice Hall, writing for the majority, held:
[wie conclude that every such municipality must, by its land use
regulations, presumptively make realistically possible an appropriate
variety and choice of housing. More specifically, presumptively it
cannot foreclose the opportunity of the classes of people mentioned
for low and moderate income housing and in its regulations must affirmatively afford that opportunity at least to the extent of the municipality's fair share of the present and prospective regional need therefor.4
In reaching this conclusion, the court recognized New Jersey's need
for affordable, decent housing.4' The court discussed how the state had
changed, "shedding" its rural nature and undergoing large population increases." It addressed the problems of cities, where the erosion of the
tax base had led to the cities' inability to provide essential services, to
offer a decent life for its residents, and had led employers to move to the
suburbs for safer and cheaper working environments.49
Viewing all of these changes in their entirety, the court maintained
that the police power of the state was to be used in a way to promote the
general welfare.' Furthermore, the majority decided the need for housing was so acute"' that municipalities' parochial interests 2 did not outweigh the wrongful exclusion of certain classes of citizenry. 3 Justice Hall
43 See Frederic S. Schwartz, The Fair Housing Act and Discriminatory Effect: A New
Perspective, 11 NOvAL. REv. 71, 95 (1986).
44 See id. (quoting Mount Laurel 1, 67 N.J. at 174, 336 A.2d at 724).
45 See Mount Laurel 1, 67 N.J. at 175, 336 A.2d at 725.
46 Id. at 174, 336 A.2d at 724.
47 See id. at 158, 336 A.2d at 716.
48 See id. at 160, 336 A.2d at 717.
4
See id. at 173, 336 A.2d at 724.
50 See Mount Laurel 1, 67 N.J. at 174-75, 336 A.2d at 725.
5' See id. at 203, 336 A.2d at 740. The Department of Community Affairs estimated
the need for 400,000 units in New Jersey.
52 See id. at 185, 336 A.2d at 730-31. In Mount Laurel 1, the township asserted that

its zoning ordinance was designed to maintain the tax base and prevent the incurring of
additional costs such as increased municipal services and school funding.
53 See id. at 186, 336 A.2d at 731.
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submitted that zoning regulations designed to exclude persons based on
income did not comport with the general welfare and were invalid.'
Notably, the court's opinion was detailed in its assessment of New
Jersey's housing problems and Mt. Laurel's exclusionary zoning prac-

tices.55 But the court's remedy covered less than two pages.' Instead, the
court mistakenly relied on the good faith of the municipalities to amend
their exclusionary zoning ordinances and provide their regional fair
share.57
Justice Pashman's concurrence in Mount Laurel I would herald the

inception of remedial measures that the Mount Laurel II Court would
later adopt and expand.

This time when Ethel Lawrence's case came before the state's highest court, the court issued a 212-page decision that included remedies
seemingly amounting to legislation.

Indeed, this time Ethel Lawrence

was not alone. New Jersey's Public Advocate 5 brought suit against
twenty-seven other municipalities for failing to comply with Mt. Laurel
L'

All of these suits were stayed while the supreme court decided the

consolidated cases in Mourn Laurel HI.'
Writing for an unanimous court, Chief Justice Wilentz drafted a
forceful opinion that would reiterate the goals of Mount Laurel I and set

out remedies in light of legislative inaction.61 The court, frustrated by
54 See id. at 175, 336 A.2d at 725.

55 See Mount Laurel 1, 67 N.J. at 191-93, 336 A.2d at 734-35.
Justice Pashman's
concurrence added that Mount Laurel's exclusionary zoning ordinances included: minimum requirements for square footage of housing; minimum lot size and front acreage requirements; prohibition of multi-dwellings; bedroom restrictions; and overzoning for nonresidential uses. See id.
36 See id. But see Justice Pashman's concurrence regarding judicial enforcement.
The concurrence set forth the factors that trial courts should utilize when creating relief.
Those factors included: "(1) identifying the relevant region; (2) determining the present
and future housing needs of the region; (3) allocating these needs among the various municipalities in the region; and (4) shaping a suitable remedial order." See id. at 215-16,
336 A.2d at 747.
57 See id. at 192, 336 A.2d at 734.
So On July 1, 1994, the Whitman Administration abolished the Public Advocate's Offlee (the Office). Prior to its abolition, supporters of the Public Advocate lobbied Governor Christine Todd Whitman to keep the Office opened to "protect the little guy." Opponents of the Public Advocate viewed the Office as an "unbridled, dictatorial watchdog
that pursued a leftist agenda." The Governor's comment was that the office "had outlived its usefulness." See Donna Leusner, Stroke of the Pen Dismantles Public Advocate,
STAR LEDGER, June 30, 1994, at 26.
'" Stanley C. Van Ness, On the Public Advocate's Involvement in Mount Laurel, 14
SEroN HALL L. REv. 832, 836 (1984).
6D See id.
61 See generally Southern Burlington County N.A.A.C.P. v. Township of Mount

Laurel, 92 N.J. 158, 456 A.2d 390 (1983).
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non-compliance, sought to compel the enforcement of the constitutional
mandate enunciated in Mount Laurel L'
In doing so, the court recognized the gaps in Mount Laurel I that
had left many questions' unresolved. In Mount Laurel II, the court developed definitions" and remedies', while at the same time encouraging
the Legislature to act and to assist in enforcing the Court's constitutional
flat.'
Once again, the Court struck down numerous zoning ordinances and
reemphasized its power to do so. 67 "The basis for the constitutional obligation is simple," wrote the Chief Justice:
[t]he State controls the use of land, all of the land. In exercising that
control it cannot favor rich over poor. It cannot legislatively set aside
dilapidated housing in urban ghettos" for the poor and decent housing
elsewhere for everyone else. The government that controls this land
represents everyone. While the state may not have the ability to
eliminate poverty, it cannot use that condition as the basis for imposing further disadvantages. And the same applies to the municipality...

9

Not only did the Court clearly set forth its mandate and the municipalities' obligation, it explicitly stated that towns must take affirmative
steps to meet the mandate.'
These included affirmative steps such as
density bonuses to developers and mandatory set-asides of new low to

62 See id. at 204-05, 456 A.2d at 413 (citing Mount Laurel 1, 67 N.J. at 174, 336
A.2d at 713).
63 For example, "[wlas it a developing municipality? What was the region and how
was the region to be determined? How was the fair share to be calculated within that region? Precisely what must that municipality do to affirmatively afford an opportunity for
the construction of lower income housing?" See id. at 205, 456 A.2d at 413.
64 See generally Southern Burlington County N.A.A.C.P. v. Township of Mount
Laurel, 92 N.J. 158, 456 A.2d 390 (1983).

65

See generally id.

66 See id. at 352, 456 A.2d at 490.
67 See id. at 208, 456 A.2d at 415.
63 The court expressed much concern over the isolation of low-income groups incertain areas. Those areas affect all citizens of New Jersey. The court addressed issues
such as urban blight, decay, violent crime, drug use, and jobs leaving New Jersey. The
Chief Justice submitted that these issues do not remain within the city, but spread to the
suburbs and are infectious to those living there. "In sum," the justice wrote, "the decline
of our cities and the increasing economic segregation of our population are not just isolated problems for those left behind in the cities, but a disease threatening us all. Zoning
ordinances that either encourage this process or ratify its results are not promoting our
general welfare, they are destroying it." See id. at 211, 456 A.2d at 416 n.5.
69 See Mi. Laurel 11, 92 N.J. at 209, 456 A.2d at 415.
"o See Martha Lamar et al., Mount Laurel at Work: Affordable Housing in New Jersey, 1983-1988, 41 RUTGERS L. REv. 1197, 1200 (1989).
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moderate income units. 71 In addition, the Court also encouraged litigation by builders to enforce the Mt. Laurel obligation.' This remedy,
known as the "builder's remedy, " was extremely controversial.'
The court stated that a municipality's fair share obligation must be
quantified" as to the number of units. The court suggested the use of the
State Development Growth Plan (SDGP) as a means to control where development should and would occur.7' It instituted a six year period of
repose from litigation for those municipalities that adopted housing plans
and zoning ordinances acceptable to the Council on Affordable Housing
(COAH). 7 ' Finally, in dealing with enforcement, the court set up a
"separate" judiciary to deal with Mount Laurel litigation.'
The Mount Laurel II court recognized the doctrine was right but its
administration wrong." The court reinforced the Mount Laurel doctrine,
expressed its displeasure over past non-compliance, mandated affirmative
future steps and reemphasized the need for housing, not litigation.' The
court reiterated the need for legislative involvement and issued a challenge to the other branches of government:
[W]hile we have always preferred legislative to judicial action in this
field, we shall continue- until the Legislature acts- to do our best to
uphold the constitutional obligation that underlies the Mount Laurel

71

See id.

See id. at 1201.
Id. at 307, 456 A.2d at 467.
74 This remedy was not new but the Court reinforced its use to achieve Mount Laurel
objectives. The builder's remedy allowed a court to issue a permit to a developer if the
proposed development met three factors: (1) "[i]t provided lower-income housing; (2) it
was consistent with sound planning criteria; and (3) the municipality had failed to meet its
Mount Laurel obligations." Lamar et al., supra note 70, at 1201 (citing Mt. Laurel 11, 92
N.J. at 279-80, 456 A.2d at 452).
75 See id.
76 See Mount Laurel 1I, 92 N.J. at 214, 456 A.2d at 418. The Court was concerned
that Mount Laurel not be used to develop land carte-blanche. Instead the Court envisioned development through sound planning in growth areas. The Court also noted that a
municipality's fair share could be affected by practical realities such as land availability,
environmental concerns, and transportation problems for potential residents.
77 See Lamar et al., supra note 70, at 1201 (citing Mt. Laurel 11, 92 N.J. at 291-92,
456 A.2d at 458-59.)
78 This separate judiciary consisted of three judges who, with time, would become
well acquainted with the issues and render consistent opinions. In so doing, the Court
expressed the need for efficiency-the need for housing, not litigation. These judges had
the power to appoint special masters to help municipalities make necessary changes. See
Mount Laurel 11, 92 N.J. at 281-84, 456 A.2d at 453-54.
79 See id. at 351-52, 456 A.2d at 490.
80 See id. at 352, 456 A.2d at 490.
72

'
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doctrine. That is our duty. We may not build houses, but we do enforce the Constitution. 8'

The Legislature accepted this challenge and NJFHA was passed in
1985. The enactment was a result of heated debates by the sponsors of
NJFHA and the Governor's office.' Under threat of veto by Governor
Kean, the Legislature amended the NJFHA bill to: (1) increase permissible Regional Contribution Agreements (RCAs) from 30% to 50%; (2)
place a moratorium on the builder's remedy; (3) change the definitions of
"fair share"' 3 and "prospective need";" and (4) impose a six-year statute
of repose for those municipalities who reach settlement with the state
agency, known as COAH.'
Interestingly enough, one of the primary objectives of NJFHA was
to eliminate the judiciary from land use planning.' During the legislative
debate, Governor Kean stated that he would support a constitutional
amendment that would ban the judiciary from land use matters.' Finally,
when NJFHA was passed, the Mount Laurel doctrine was placed into the
hands of COAH."s
Several important provisions of NJFHA include the creation of
COAH" to calculate housing needs for municipalities; substantive certification;' a housing element; 9 mediation and review process;' a phase-in
81 Id.
82 Wynona M. Lipman, The 'Fair" Housing Act?, 9 SETON HALL L.J. 569, 570
(1986). Senator Lipman was an original sponsor of NJFHA. By the time the bill went to
a full vote, the Senator could no longer support the bill. See id.
83 When adopting a "fair share" number, the Council should take into consideration
(1) the environment and historical sites; (2) drastic alterations; (3) adequate use of land
for recreational, conservation, and farming needs; (4) adequacy of open space; and (5)
development contrary to the SDGP. See Jerome G. Rose, New Jersey Enacts a Fair
Housing Law, 14 REALEST. L.J. 195, 203 (1986).
84 See id. (noting that the amendment would change the calculation of prospective
need, basing iton actual development and growth rather than on statistics.).
8' See id. at 204.
86 See id. at 211 ('The formulation of housing and land use policy by the judiciary,
no matter how commendable and meritorious that policy is, constitutes a usurpation by
the judiciary of the powers of the legislature.").
87 See Rose, supra note 83, at 212.
0 See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:270-305 (West 1996).
89 See id.The agency also has the "authority to determine whether a municipality's
fair share plan truly provides realistic opportunity for affordable housing." Alexander's
Dept. Store of New Jersey, Inc. v. Borough of Paramus, 125 N.J. 100, 112, 592 A.2d
1168, 1174 (1991). The scope of COAH's power is broad. See Franzese, supra note 7,
at 36. COAH has the authority to promulgate "whatever rules and regulations may be
necessary to achieve its statutory task." Mount Laurel II1, 103 N.J. at 1, 510 A.2d at
621.
go Procedures were put in place whereby a municipality would submit a plan to
COAH. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-309(a) (West 1996). In turn COAH would issue
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period for municipalities in developing and implementing their fair share;
financial assistance to the municipalities; a two-year moratorium on the
builder's remedy; and the creation of RCAs.'
RCAs enable a municipality to "transfer up to 50% of its fair share
to another municipality within its region by means of a contractual
agreement into which two municipalities voluntarily enter." 9' While
much commentary and scholarly work has been written about Mount Laurel, little has been written about RCAs and their effects and RCAs have
not been litigated to any great degree."
RCAs have been called "compensation for exclusionary zoning" be-

cause urban areas are literally compensated for costs they bear as a result
of exclusionary zoning by suburbs. 96 While some scholars theorize that
RCAs are an efficient use for development of land, others question the
ability of the receiving municipality (usually urban) (1) to voluntarily

enter into such agreements and (2) to afford such agreements.'
Indeed, RCAs may cause an increase in the number of poor who

seek new housing."

A city's acceptance of such persons only increases

its overall costs because the needs of such indigents are often met by mu-

nicipal funds. 9

°
Alternatively, indigents may be displaced by RCAs. W

a certification if such plan conformed to Mount Laurel requirements. See N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 52:27D-314 (West 1996).
9' See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-309(a) (West 1996): "Mhe municipality shall prepare and file with the council a housing element, based on the council's criteria and
guidelines.. . ").
92 This provision removes objections to substantive certification from the courts to an
administrative review process. If material objections still exist after a determination by
COAH, an appeal to the New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division could be taken
by the party opposing the granting of certification. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-315(a)
(West 1996). This procedure creates a burden on the opposing party because the determination by COAH is considered presumptively valid. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D317 (West 1996).
93 See Rose, supra note 83, at 196.
94 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-312(a) (West 1996).
" But see Hills Dev. Co. v. Township of Bernards, 103 N.J. 1, 510 A.2d 621
(1986); In re Warren, 132 N.J. 1, 622 A.2d 1257 (1993).
96 See Harold A. McDougall, Regional Contribution Agreements: Compensation for
Exclusionary Zoning, 60 TEMP. L.Q. 665, 666 (1987). As Justice Pashman recognized
[in Mount Laurel 1], "municipalities were using their zoning power to take advantage of
Id.
regional development without having to bear the burdens of such development."
(citing Mount Laurel 1, 67 N.J. at 195, 336 A.2d at 736 (Pashman, J., concurring)).
9 See id. at 682. "The receiving municipalities are burdened by an overabundance
of poor residents, a rapidly shrinking tax base, and the disappearance of federal subsidies
They [the cities] will enter into the RCA
and its bargaining power is thus limited ....
because they face the stark reality of fiscal crisis and will regard RCA funds as a new
revenue source with which to service the populations they already house." Id.
See id. at 683-84.
9 See id. at 684.
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Urban renewal programs have tended to displace the poor.

1

Urban ar-°2

eas are rebuilt for educational, business, and cultural institutions.'

These institutions tend to displace the poor because many patrons do not
wish to come in contact with certain types of people. 03

Startling but true, urban renewal pushes poor, most often minority,
dwellers into other slum areas.10 ' The lack of urban revitalization sends
jobs elsewhere and rehabilitating housing becomes a waste of assets."°5
Concentrated pockets of poor, minority areas increase costs overall.'" '
The vicious cycle continues.
Such truisms have forced housing advocates to critically examine
RCAs, as they conflict with the letter and spirit of Mount Laurel. RCAs
merit close examination concerning the fairness of the allocation between
the city and suburb;"° the bargaining power of each party 1 "° the extent
that RCAs give suburbs "a free ride"; 10 and the disparate impact based
10 See id. A sending municipality, with the approval of COAH, will send/contribute
money to the receiving municipality. This agreement usually occurs between a suburb
and city (e.g., In Region 2, Roseland to Newark). The contribution is to be used for
housing. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-312(c) (West 1996). Cities, such as Newark,
through these types of funds and the like are attempting to rebuild.their communities. "In
theory, urban renewal was a program intended to revitalize the city for both blacks and
whites." Reggie Oh, Comment, Apartheid in America: Residential Segregation and the
Colorline in the Twenty-First Century, 15 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 385, 395 (1995) (citing
Hum.L LEvINE & LAWRENCE HARMON, THE DEATH OF AN AMERICAN JEWISH COMMuNrrY: A TRAGEDY OF GOOD INTENTIONs (1992)). "In reality, urban renewal became
known as "Negro removal," because the programs only intensified the segregation and
isolation of inner-city blacks." See id. (citing DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A.
DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 9,

56 (1983)).
1o1See Oh, supra note 100, at 395.
102 See id. at 394 (citing MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 100, at 55).
103 See id.
104 See id. at 395. (MASSEY & DENTON maintain that urban renewal programs worsen
segregation because they "frequently only shifted the problems of blight, crime and instability from areas adjacent to elite white neighborhoods to locations deeper inside the black
ghetto.") (citations omitted).
105 See Anthony M. Vaida, Affordable Housing in New Jersey- The Still-Unrealized
Dream, 20 REAL EST. L.J. 85, 89-90 (1991).
106'See Hartnett, supra note 39, at 107-08. An increased need for police, prisons and
social services becomes necessary; insurance rates increase; and jobs are lost. When this
type of life emerges, frustration grows and the Los Angeles Riots are inevitable.
107 See McDougall, supra note 96, at 684.
1(6 See id. Suburban bargaining power is enhanced by the NJFHA and its provisions.
RCAs allow suburbs to avoid their responsibilities for developing low to moderate income
housing under the Mount Laurel doctrine. See id. at 688.
109 See McDougall, supra note 96, at 684.
The cities are forced by exclusionary zoning to absorb poor and underemployed people who are drawn to the area by its economic development but
who cannot earn wages sufficient to afford decent housing. People in these
circumstances burden the public facilities of the city without appreciably
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on race whereby minorities live in overcrowded, poorly-funded cities and
Whites live in suburbs that provide opportunities of many types. 110
After NJFHA was passed, many praised the legislation as revolutionary and unique."' Finally, the state legislature had enacted a statute
to implement the goals of Mount Laurel, thus taking a stronger role and
limiting the judiciary."' What seemingly began as a creative answer to
the highest court's request for help in enforcement of Mount Laurel
slowly became an obstruction to its true intent and purpose. It has been
22 years since Mount Laurel I and 12 years since NJFHA, and still New
Jersey communities are segregated.
The Study clearly shows that NJFHA, COAH, 1 3 and its regulations
have not resulted in integration of New Jersey communities. RCAs, a
mechanism created within NJFHA and enforced by COAH thwart integration by allowing white suburban communities to sell their fair share to
urban communities so their neighborhoods stay relatively the same while
urban cities are forced to keep the poor.
NJFHA and RCAs 4 have not gone unchallenged by housing advocates. In 1986, one year after its enactment, NJFHA was upheld by the
New Jersey Supreme Court in Mount Laurel III.15 The constitutional
challenge to NJFHA was primarily based on the ability of NJFHA to implement the Mount Laurel obligation.116 Issues in the Mount Laurel III
case did not include a Title VIII challenge.
Chief Justice Wilentz, in affirming NJFHA, applauded the legislative effort and recalled that the court had urged the Legislature to act in
Mount Laurel 1117 The Chief Justice wrote that the legislative response

adding to the municipal tax base. On the other hand, suburbs use exclusionary zoning to free themselves of responsibility for such people, instead
homogenizing their population to include only persons who impose less on
public facilities and add more to the tax base.
See id. at 691-92 (citations omitted).
1o See WISH & EISDORFER, supra note 1, at 20. "Because poor people... are disproportionately Black or Latino, exclusionary zoning has the foreseeable effect of restricting Blacks and Latinos to the cities, fostering and perpetuating racial segregation
.
I d.
"
See Monaghan, supra note 8, at 585.
112 See Franzese, supra note 7, at 33, 35.

13 See Vaida, supra note 105, at 86 (COAH is "one of the state's most ineffective bureaucracies.").
14 See In re Warren, 247 N.J. Super. 146, 588 A.2d 1227 (1991).
"13 See Mount Laurel 111, 103 N.J. at 1,510 A.2d at 621.
116 Mount Laurel 111, 103 N.J. at 40, 510 A.2d at 642. The Act was also challenged
on the basis that it interfered with judicial power. See id.
137 See id. at 24, 510 A.2d at 634. "They [the legislature] has responded. It appears
to be a significant response." See id.
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has "trigger[ed] our readiness to defer. We hold that the Act [NJFHA]
is constitutional ... "l's
The court, in one paragraph, addressed RCAs and the rationale for
these agreements." 9 The Court stipulated, however, that the agreements

should be in keeping with "convenient access to employment opportunities and conform to sound comprehensive regional planning.""
Mount Laurel III marked the court's readiness to withdraw from the
field.' But the court left open its ability to re-enter the fray when and if
NJFHA did not fulfill the constitutional mandate of Mount Laurel.'22 In

closing, the court's opinion stated:
No one should assume that our exercise of comity today signals a

weakening of our resolve to enforce the constitutional rights of New
Jersey's lower income citizens. The constitutional obligation has not
changed; the judiciary's ultimate duty to enforce it has not changed;
our determination to perform that duty has not changed. 123
Five years later, in 1991, NJFHA and COAH's regulatory powers
were challenged in New Jersey's appellate court." Included in this suit
brought by the Public Advocate, was the claim that RCAs and priority
preference regulations were invalid." The Public Advocate brought suit
after COAH granted substantive certification of several municipalities'
fair share plans." The Public Advocate asserted that RCAs and priority
preferences violated equal protection, the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD)" 7 and Title VIII." 3
118 See id.
119 See id. at 38, 510 A.2d at 641. Such rationale included eliminating the financial
burden of fair share from municipalities and rehabilitating housing in urban areas where
most lower income people live. See id.
"* Mount Laurel I1, 103 N.J. at 38, 510 A.2d at 641.
121 See id. at 64, 510 A.2d at 655.
'22 See id. at 23, 510 A.2d at 633. "If, however, as predicted by its opponents, the
Act [NJFHA], despite the intention behind it, achieves nothing but delay, the judiciary
will be forced to resume its appropriate role." See id.
123 See id. at 66, 510 A.2d at 655.
124 See In re Warren, 247 N.J. Super. 146, 588 A.2d 1227 (1991).
'2' See id. at 157, 588 A.2d at 1233. Occupancy preferences were created by COAH
through an administrative regulation. See N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 5, § 92-15.1 (West
1996). Such regulation provides: "[for all low and moderate income housing units provided in inclusionary developments, municipalities shall establish occupancy such that
initially, no more that 50% of the units are available to income eligible households that
reside in the municipality or work in the municipality and reside elsewhere." See id.
12
In re Warren, 246 N.J. Super. at 146, 588 A.2d at 1227. NJFHA allows for challenges to the grant of substantive certification. After a final agency determination, such
objections may be appealed to the appellate division.
'27 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-1 et seq. (West 1996).
128 See In re Warren, 246 N.J. Super. at 146, 588 A.2d at 1227.
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The Public Advocate contested RCAs on two grounds.' First, that
RCAs violate the spirit of Mount Laurel because the agreements shift
proposed suburban housing to municipalities that were already overwhelmed with their share of regional low-income households." Second,
that RCAs violate constitutional and statutory bans against racial discrimination' 1 because such agreements construct housing in areas where
a disproportionately large number of minorities reside as opposed to constructing housing where little or no minorities reside."32
The appellate division held that RCAs did not violate Tide VII because the Public Advocate had failed to establish a prima facie case.'"
The court concluded that the Public Advocate's reliance on 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 3604(a)" (Title VIII) was misplaced and inapplicable to RCAs.' 35 The
Court stated that even if a prima facie case was proven, a compelling
justification for RCAs is the urban revitalization realized and this justification further negated a possible Title VIII violation."

129 See id. at 162, 588 A.2d at 1235.
'30

See id.

131 Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq.; New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, N.J.'STAT. ANN. § 10:5-1 etseq. (West 1996).

See In re Warren, 247 N.J. Super. 146, 162, 588 A.2d 1227, 1235 (1991).
See id. There are several tests to establish a prima facie case of disparate impact of
racial discrimination regarding Title VIII. These tests have been set forth by the circuits
and will be discussed in depth in Part III of this paper. See Metropolitan Housing Dev.
Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 588 F.2d. 1283, 1290 (7th Cir. 1977); Resident
Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 149 (3d Cir. 1977); Huntington Branch
N.A.A.C.P. v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 938-40 (2d Cir. 1988).
134Section 3604(a) of Title 42 of the U.S. Code makes it unlawful "[tlo refuse to sell
or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental
of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race,
color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin."
135In re Warren, 247 N.J. Super. at 168-69, 588 A.2d at 1239. "This prohibition
against discrimination in the sale or rental of real property has no applicability to a decision by a suburban municipality to fund the construction or rehabilitation of housing in an
urban municipality rather than to rezone for multifamily housing within its own boundaries." But cf. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 588 F.2d at 1283, holding that under
some circumstances, a violation of § 3604(a) can be proven by showing discriminatory
effect without showing intent. There are two types of effects. The second, "is the effect
which the decision has on the community; if it perpetuates segregation and thereby prevents interracial association it will be considered invidious under the Fair Housing
Act... " See id. at 1289-90.
136In re Warren, 247 N.J. Super. at 169, 588 A.2d at 1239. In some circuits, under a
racial disparate impact claim, the plaintiff must prove a prima facie case. Once established, the defendant may offer "a legitimate, bona-fide governmental interest" that could
not be served by less discriminatory means. See Huntington Branch N.A.A.C.P., 844
F.2d at 936. But see Huntington Branch N.A.A.C.P. where the Second Circuit held that
there are less intrusive means of accomplishing urban renewal than allowing zoning
which perpetuates segregation. See 844 F.2d at 939.
132
133
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As to the occupancy preference, a divided Court upheld the regulation's constitutionality. 3 7 Judge Shebell, however, dissenting in part,
submitted that "local preferences detract from the Mount Laurel objective" by not providing housing to lower income persons who reside
within a particular region, but not in a particular municipality.13 It was
on this issue that the New Jersey Supreme Court granted certification.
In 1993, the New Jersey Supreme Court invalidated COAH's local
preference regulation. 39 The court denied the petition for certification on
the RCA issue."4 In striking down the local preference regulation, the
court concluded that this regulation was inconsistent with calculating a
region's fair share and thus not a "valid exercise of agency rule-

making." 141
Notably, as to the Title VIII violation, the Supreme Court stated:
[O]ur disposition of these appeals will focus essentially on the
grounds implicating the State's affordable-housing policy and will not
rest primarily on the alleged violation of Title VIII. Further, the ultimate resolution of federal and state discrimination issues requires, in

our view, a broader and more detailed record than that before the
Court. 142

The court then summarized the "prevailing principles" of Title VIII
and LAD violations but declined to "resolve or address those issues. " "
The Court maintained, however, that precedent strongly suggested that
proof of discriminatory impact alone is enough to establish a discrimination claim.144
This precedent, coupled with the statistical data set forth herein,
provides a viable challenge in the federal courts that NJFHA provisions,
namely RCAs, as applied, create a disparate impact based on race and
national origin. Such impact is a violation of Title VIII. The Court
should prohibit RCAs because, as applied, they perpetuate racial segregation.

137 As to the Title VIII violation, the appellate division stated, "unless an occupancy
preference for government sponsored housing is adopted as a subterfuge for discrimination on the basis of race... it does not violate the federal Fair Housing Act." See In re
Warren, 247 N.J. Super. at 176, 588 A.2d at 1242-43.
See id. at 183, 588 A.2d at 1246.
39 See In re Township of Warren, 132 N.J. 1, 622 A.2d 1257 (1993) [hereinafter In
re Warren IA.
" See id. at 8, 622 A.2d at 1261.
141 See id. at 31, 622 A.2d at 1272.
142 Id. at 21, 588 A.2d at 1267.
14 See id. at 22-26, 622 A.2d at 1267-69.
'"

See In re Warren 1N 132 N.J. at 25, 622 A.2d at 1269.
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III. TITLE VIII
Title VIII was first introduced into Congress by Senator Walter
Mondale and the chances for its passing through the House were very
slim. 1" During the summer of 1968, however, Dr. Martin Luther King,
Jr. was assassinated and urban riots were commonplace."4 It was those
events that prompted Congress to pass the Fair Housing Act. 47
The broad sweep of Title VIII sought to remedy segregation of
America's neighborhoods'" by replacing ghettos with "truly integrated

and balanced living patterns."' Indeed, in GladstoneRealtors v. Village
of Bellwood, the United States Supreme Court remarked on the importance of integration" and addressed the adverse consequences of segregation."' By providing a private cause of action under Title VIII, Con-

gress attempted to ameliorate the two societies in America - one white one black.2
In establishing a violation of Title VIII courts generally look for
discriminatory intent or motive.'
Courts, however, have held that Title

VIII does not require intent or motive' to be shown by a plaintiff, but
only that the defendant's action had a discriminatory effect. 55 Effect,
courts have held, is the "touchstone" of discriminatory practices because:
clever men may easily conceal their motivations, but more importantly, because... whatever our law was once... it now firmly

Hartnett, supra note 39, at 93.
id.
" See id.

145

146 See

14 Huntington Branch N.A.A.C.P. v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 927 (2d
Cir. 1988).
149 Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 211 (citing 114 CONG.
REC. 2706).
"0 441 U.S. 91, 111 (1979). "As we have said before, '[t]here can be no question
about the importance to a community of promoting stable, racially integrated housing."
See id. (quoting Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 94
(1977)).
"'t See id. at 110-11. The Court noted the diminution of the tax base and school segregation.
152 See Hartnett, supra note 39, at 90.
153 See Schwartz, supra note 43, at 72.
l-4 See United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1185 (8th Cir. 1974)
("The plaintiff need make no showing whatsoever that the action resulting in racial discrimination in housing was racially motivated.") (footnote omitted).
1M See Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 146 (3d Cir. 1977) ("We conclude that, in Title VIII cases ... unrebutted proof of discriminatory effect alone may
justify a federal equitable response."); City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d at 1184 ("To establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination, the plaintiff need prove no more than that
the conduct of the defendant actually or predictably results in racial discrimination; in
other words, that it has a discriminatory effect.").
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recognizes that the arbitrary quality of thoughtlessness can be as disastrous and unfair to private rights and the public interest as the perversity of a willful scheme. 56

Discriminatory effect is often found through the use of statistical
data.1 7 The circuits, however, differ as to whether a prima facie case is
established by statistical data alone.15
Courts have recognized two types of discriminatory effects"3 9 that a
facially neutral housing policy could have on race.lW The first is when a
policy has "a greater adverse impact on one racial group than on another."'" The second is when the policy "perpetuates segregation and
thereby prevents interracial association" even though the policy does not
have a disparate impact on a particular race." But while courts have
recognized a discriminatory effect test, the circuits differ as to the "exact
role played by discriminatory effect.""
In Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., the Seventh Circuit
concluded that in some cases, discriminatory effect is enough to show a
violation of Title VIII.' The court refused to conclude, however, "that
every action which produces a discriminatory effect is illegal."" Seemingly, for the Seventh Circuit, statistical data is not enough to establish a
prima facie case. 1"
To determine whether the discriminatory effect is sufficient to establish a prima facie case, the Seventh Circuit developed a four-prong
test:
City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d at 1185 (citations omitted).
See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 307 (1977).
55 See id. at 307. The United States Supreme Court concluded, "[wlhere gross statistical disparities can be shown, they alone may in a proper case constitute prima facie
156

157

proof of a pattern or practice of discrimination." Id. Although Hazetwood is a Title VII
case, lower courts have applied a similar rationale to Title VIII cases. The Supreme
Court, however, has yet to address this issue in a Title VIII context, and thus the circuits
differ as to whether statistical data alone establishes a prima facie case of racial discrimination under Title VIII. Notably, the Supreme Court passed on addressing this issue in
Town of Huntington v. HuntingtonBranch N.A.A. C.P., 488 U.S. 15, 18 (1988).
159 See Schwartz, supra note 43, at 72.
16oSee Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 588 F.2d.
1283, 1290 (7th Cir. 1977).
161 See id. (This test was originally developed in a Title VII case where the U.S. Supreme Court held that Title VII "proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation." Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971)).
1,2Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 588 F.2d at 1290.
163 See Schwartz, supra note 43, at 74.
16 See Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 588 F.2d at 1290.
165 id.

16 See Schwartz, supra note 43, at 74 n.18.
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(1) how strong is plaintiff's showing of discriminatory effect; (2) is

there some evidence of discriminatory intent, though not enough to
satisfy the constitutional standard of Washington v. Davis;167 (3) what
is the defendant's interest in taking the action complained of; and (4)
does the plaintiff seek to compel the defendant to affirmatively provide housing for members of minority groups or merely to restrain defendant from interfering6 with individual property owners who wish to
provide such housing. 8

Few circuits, however, have adopted this test."
In Arlington
Heights, the circuit court remanded the case to the district court with a
procedure for the lower court to follow."7
Other circuits have held that a showing of discriminatory effect is
enough to establish a prima facie case. 71 But the discriminatory effect
may be rebutted by the defendant if the defendant can show a
"compelling governmental interest " " or "a legitimate, bona fide interest" that cannot be achieved through an "alternative course of action"
with a less discriminatory effect."
In City of Black Jack, the Eighth Circuit concluded that a prima fa-

cie case of racial discrimination can be shown by proof of a racially discriminatory effect."7 4 Once the plaintiff has established this, the burden is
167 Washington v. Davis is an Equal Protection case where the U.S. Supreme Court
held that motive and/or intent is required to establish a violation. See 426 U.S. 229
(1976).
168 Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 558 F.2d at 1290.
16 See Schwartz, supra note 43, at 75.
170 See Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 558 F.2d at 1294. The court noted, however, that the case was a close call. "The Village is acting pursuant to a legitimate grant
of authority and there is no evidence that its refusal to rezone was the result of intentional
discrimination. On the other hand, plaintiffs are seeking to effectuate the national goal of
integrated housing within Arlington Heights and are asking nothing more of the Village
than that they be allowed to pursue that objective. Whether the Village's refusal to rezone has a discriminatory impact because it effectively assures that Arlington Heights will
remain a segregated community is unclear from the record." Id.
171 See Schwartz, supra note 43, at 75.
172 United States v. City of Blackjack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1185 (8th Cir. 1974).
173 Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 149 (3d Cir. 1977). But see where
the court indicated that the Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., factors could be
considered to determine the merits of a Title VIII case. See id. at 148 n.32.
" See City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d at 1184. In this case the City of Black Jack's
county zoning board adopted a plan for the county's 1700 acres. By 1970, the city's
housing consisted of 483 acres of single family homes and 15 acres of multi-dwelling
homes. During this time, an organization sought to build additional multi-dwelling units
for persons of low to moderate income housing. Once the plan became public, opposition
was fierce. In response, the city's government passed a zoning ordinance that prohibited
multi-family housing. Statistical data revealed that the City's population was 98%-99%
White and 1%-2% Black. Black Jack's virtually all White population was strikingly dissimilar to the racial composition of the surrounding areas. While the percentage of
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shifted to the defendant to show that its conduct furthered a compelling
governmental interest.175 While the lower court concluded that the ordinance had "no measurably greater effect on blacks that on whites," the
Eighth Circuit reversed.176
The court of appeals maintained that the lower court erred in failing
to consider the "ultimate effect" or "historical context" of the ordinance. 1" The ultimate effect of the city's actions foreclosed new housing
to 85% of Blacks in the area, of which 40% were living in substandard
housing."

In determining whether the city's justifications1 rose to the level of
"compelling governmental interest," the court examined (1) whether the
ordinance actually furthered the city's interests; (2) whether those interests were constitutionally permissible and compelling enough to outweigh
the harm; and (3) whether there were less intrusive means to attain those
interests. In addressing the city's justifications, the court found no factual
basis for any of the city's reasons and thus struck down the ordinance on
Title VIII grounds."W Apparently the court struck down the ordinance
based on both intent and segregative effect. '
The Third Circuit in Resident Advisory Board v. Rizzo found a violation of Title VIII."s In Rizzo, the dispute centered around a piece of
vacant land proposed for low-income housing in 1959."

Over the years the area in dispute had become a predominantly
The urban renewal program
white area as a result of urban renewal.'
Blacks increased only slightly in the entire county, the percentage of Blacks in the urban
areas of the county more than doubled. Additionally, urban Blacks were disproportionately found in overcrowded and substandard housing.
171

See id. at 1185.

'76 See id. at 1186.
'77 See id.
17 See id. ("Black Jack's action is but one more factor confining blacks to low-income
housing in the center city confirming the inexorable process whereby the St. Louis metropolitan area becomes one that 'has the racial shape of the donut, with the Negroes in
the hole and with mostly Whites occupying the ring.'"). See id. (citations omitted).
179 The city primarily relied on three justifications: control of roads and traffic, prevention of overcrowding of schools; and property values. See City of Black Jack, 508
F.2d at 1186. There was also some evidence in the record below that there was no need
for multi-dwelling units. See id.
'8o See id. at 1186-87.
181 See Schwartz, supra note 43, at 79.
182 See Rirzo, 564 F.2d at 126.
'83 See id. at 131.
'84 See id. at 130. In the 1950s, Blacks lived in a five-block area and constituted 46%
of the population. After the urban renewal program, only four black families lived within
the five blocks. By 1970, not one Black family lived in the Southeast comer of Whitman.
The 1970 census revealed that only 100 Blacks remained in the urban renewal area, down
from the 400 who lived there in 1960. See id. at 131-32.
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essentially created a concentration of minority sections in one part of the
city while, at the same time, reducing the number of Blacks residing in
the disputed part."s
The public opposition to the construction of low-income housing
was fierce.1 " In 1971, a newly elected mayor, Frank Rizzo, publicly opposed the project and instructed his administration to investigate the possibility of canceling the development.'" After a 57-day trial, the district
court judge issued an order for construction of low-income housing.'"
At the outset, the Third Circuit stated that the "district court correctly reached the merits of the dispute"'" and affirmed the district court
in all but one part of its order."9 3
The Third Circuit noted that the proposed housing project had a
"racially disproportionate effect, adverse to Blacks and other minorities
in Philadelphia."' The project's purpose, however, the court submitted,
was to give Blacks and other minorities the opportunity to live in
"integrated, non-racially impacted neighborhoods," in keeping with the
policy of Title VIII.1
The importance of Rizzo with regard to Title VIII, Mount Laurel,
and RCAs is five-fold. First, Title VIII prevents state action that does
not comport with Title VIII's policy of the opportunity to live in
"integrated, non-racially impacted neighborhoods.""' Second, Title VIII
Will be enforced without a showing of intent." Third, a Title VIII vio-

'
See id. at 130-31. "The net result has been, in the words of the district court, that
'the City of Philadelphia is today a racially segregated city.'" See id. (citing Resident
Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 425 F. Supp. 987, 1006 (E.D.Pa. 1976)).
156 See id. at 134.
Residents of the area formed an association, conducting demonstrations and blocking construction efforts for the project. See id.
"8 See Rizzo, 564 F.2d at 136 n.14. Testimony before the trial court revealed that
Mayor Rizzo "felt that there should not be any public housing placed in White neighborhoods because people in White neighborhoods did not want Black people moving with
them. Furthermore, Mayor Rizzo stated that he did not intend to allow the PHA to ruin
nice neighborhoods." See id. (citations omitted).
'
See id. at 138.
'
See id. at 139.
'90 See id. at 53.
9' See id. at 141. The waiting list for low-income housing in the city was 95% minority of which 85% were Black. The evidence showed that Blacks were concentrated in
the three poorest areas of Philadelphia.
'92 See Rizzo, 564 F.2d at 142. "Public housing offers the only opportunity for these
people, the lowest income Black households, to live outside of Black residential areas of
Philadelphia. Cancellation of the project erased that opportunity and contributed to the
maintenance of segregated housing in Philadelphia." Id.
193 See id.
19

See id. at 146.
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lation occurs where a plaintiff shows discriminatory effect1 and the governmental entity fails to provide a justification for such effect." 9 Fourth,
the justification must serve a legitimate bona fide interest that could not
be accomplished with another course of action that had a less discriminatory effect." Finally, the court stated that the level of judicial review
must be probing, with less deference to "the seemingly reasonable acts"
of government officials.'
Another telling case of "seemingly reasonable acts" of governmental officials and discriminatory effect is Huntington Branch, N.A.A.C.P.
v. Town of Huntington." In this case, the Second Circuit was asked to
determine whether the town's ordinance that restricted the development
of multi-family housing to a minority urban renewal area violated Title
VIII because the town refused to rezone and outright rejected the proposed site for new housing.'
Because this was a case of first impression for the district court, the
trial judge applied the Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp. test"° . On appeal, the Second Circuit, after an extensive discussion of the history and
purpose of Title VIH, opted for the Third Circuit's test developed in
Rizzo.' After establishing the correct test, the court looked at statistical
data" and the disparity that existed and concluded that the plaintiffs es1" Plaintiffs' evidence showed that the urban renewal activities effectively resulted in
the removal of all Black families from the area. This, the court concluded, "was sufficient to establish a prima facie case of discriminatory effect." Id. at 149.
196See id. at 146. The government's justification was the fear of violence that may
have ensued had the project been built. The court concluded, "the threat of violence
cannot justify a deprivation of civil rights." See id. at 149.
' See Rizzo, 564 F.2d at 149. Given the lack of justification, the court did not assess
the legitimacy of the government's interest. See id. at 150.
19 See id.at 148.
199See Huntington Branch N.A.A.C.P. v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 926
(2d Cir. 1988), aft'd, 488 U.S. 15 (1988).
Huntington Branch N.A.A.C.P., 844 F.2d at 928. Plaintiffs sought to construct
multi-family, subsidized housing in a predominantly white neighborhood. See id.
" See id. at 933.
2 See id. at 935-36. The court in reversing the use of Metropolitan Housing Dev.
Corp, submitted that the four-factor test was "too onerous a burden on appellants." The
court also concluded that the legislative history of Title VIII "argues persuasively against
so daunting a prima facie standard." See id. at 936.
m In 1980, Huntington's population was approximately 200,000 people. See id. at
929. Of that number, 95% of its residents were White, 3.4% were Black. See id. Of the
3.4%, 70% of Blacks lived in two areas of Huntington. See id. Of the 48 zoned residential areas in Huntington, 30 contained "Black populations of less than 1%" See id. The
district court found that housing was in short supply in Huntington and Blacks were three
times greater in need of housing than Whites. See id. Minorities far outnumbered Whites
in occupying subsidized rental housing. See id. at 938. Similarly, a disproportionate
number of minorities were on the waiting list for low income housing. See id.
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tablished their prima facie case both because of the "harm to Blacks and
the segregative impact on the entire community. " '
Because the plaintiffs established their case, the court went on to review the town's justifications.'
In refusing to rezone the site, Huntington asserted that the town had a significant interest in urban renewal and
rezoning would encourage developers to restore dilapidated neighborhoods."
In rejecting the proposed site for new housing, Huntington claimed
that the project was in violation of its Housing and Urban Development
(HUD) program calling for no new construction; the development could
not be built within the single family zoning area; the area was too heavily
trafficked; the parking area was poor as were fire access areas; areas for
recreation and play were inadequate; and living space in the individual
units was too unrealistic.'
In applying the Rizzo approach, the Second Circuit started with the
second part of the town's justification, i.e. whether another course of action that had a less discriminatory effect was available.'
The court dismissed the town's justification of urban renewal, which encourages developers to build in a particular area.'
Rather, the court commented,
developers do not build according to politics but base their decision on
much more complex criteria.21 Thus the court stated: "[i]f the Town
wishes to encourage growth in the urban renewal areas, it should do so
directly through incentives which would have a less discriminatory impact on the Town." 1 '
Notably, the Second Circuit refuted the "urban renewal" justification because there are other less discriminatory means of accomplishing
its goal. As to the town's other justifications in rejecting the site, the
court found its reasoning "entirely insubstantial." 212
Additionally, in its historical review of Huntington's housing practices, the court noted that Huntington had failed to demonstrate good

254 Huntington Branch N.A.A.C.P.,

844 F.2d at 938.

2' See id. at 939.
M6 See id.
217 See id. at 931-32.

2W See id. at 939.

M See Huntington Branch N.A.A.C.P., 844 F.2d at 939.
See id. The court concluded that if Huntington wanted urban renewal, it should

210

provide tax incentives, that have a less discriminatory effect than its present zoning policies. See id.
211
212

id. at 939.
See id. at 940. "Post hoc rationalizations by administrative agencies should be af-

forded 'little deference' by the courts." Id. (citations omitted).
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faith in building low-income housing." 3 Because of this and the protracted length of the litigation, the court ordered Huntington to rezone.214
In summary, in the Third Circuit, Title VIII is violated if a state action does not comport with Title ViII's national policy of integration and
nondiscrimination. 2 5' A Title VIII plaintiff need not prove intent. Instead, to establish a prima facie case, a plaintiff need only show discriminatory effect. After such a showing, the burden shifts to the government
to provide a justification for such effect. This justification must serve a
legitimate bona fide interest that could not be accomplished with another
course of action that had a less discriminatory effect. It is with these
factors in mind that Part IV of this analysis sets forth a prima facie case
showing that NJFHA through its RCA provisions violates Title VIII.
IV. REMEDIES

It is time to take a more aggressive approach to combating the failures of the Mount Laurel decisions and their laudable but yet unachieved
goals. Remedies include litigation, changes in the NJFHA, and in the
COAH regulations. The Mount Laurel mandate is by no means an easy
task to accomplish. At what point in time, however, do legislators and
judges recognize that integrated and affordable housing in New Jersey is
still a dream and not a reality. Twenty-two years have passed; it is now
time to act.
The purpose of this paper is to show that RCAs violate Title VIII
because, as applied, they perpetuate segregation. The Study shows that
Whites live in suburban Mount Laurel housing and Blacks and Latinos
live in urban Mount Laurel housing. Additionally, if one were to look at
a wealthy suburb that is relatively close to a major city, the tale would be
more telling, as the following illustration shows.
Plaintiff, Laurel Mount is Black and lives in Newark. Monday
through Friday, she gets into her car and drives West on Route 280 for
approximately 15 minutes and enters the Borough of Roseland. In Roseland, she is employed as a clerk/typist and earns $26,000 per year. Laurel Mount does not want to live in Newark. She wants access to good
"The history ...clearly demonstrates a pattern of stalling efforts
213 See id. at 942.
to build low income housing." Id.
214 See Huntington Branch N.A.A.C.P., 844 F.2d at 942.
215 A complaint alleging such violation would rely on 42 U.S.C.§ 3604(a); Title 42,
Section 3615 of the U.S. Code, states in part, "any law of the state, a political subdivision, or other such jurisdiction that purports to require or permit any action that would be
a discriminatory housing practice under this subchapter shall to that extent be invalid."
shall be unlawful... to interfere
Id. In addition, 42 U.S.C. § 3617 states in part, "[i]t
with any person in the exercise or enjoyment of... any right granted or protected by §
3604.".
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supermarkets and banking. She wants to go outside at night and not be
afraid. She wants good schools for the children she will have one day.
She thinks about how nice Roseland is and what a good community it
would be to live in.
Roseland, once a small, rural community is now home to a Prudential Insurance Company facility, Automatic Data Processing (ADP) and
many New Jersey law and accounting firms. Certainly, Roseland "shed"
its rural characteristics and became a developing community.
Not surprising, Roseland and Newark216 have very little in common.
The 1990 U.S. Census21' offers the following:

Per Capita Income ($)
White Population (%)
Black Population (%)
Hispanic Population (%)
Income Over $50,000 (%)
Median Home Value ($)
50+ Units (In Structure)

NEWARK
9,424
38.4
60.0
26.1
15.6
110,000
17,875

ROSELAND
26,764
95.8
.5
1.3
62.1
242,600
0

These numbers offer a picture of two communities within 15 miles
of each other physically but thousands of miles apart economically and
racially. This picture is typical in New Jersey where the state's major
urban cities are surrounded by wealthy white suburbs. While Newark
and Roseland are in the same region for COAH certification and are close
in proximity, Roseland's Black and Hispanic population is less than two
percent.
The Public Advocate challenged COAH's grant of substantive certification to Roseland in In re Warren."' COAH determined that Roseland's regional obligation was 257 units.2" 9 That number was reduced to
96 because of lack of developable land.'
Of the 96 units, Roseland,
through use of a RCA, gave Newark 66 units, leaving 30 units for Roseland. "
In addition, COAH assigned 48 units for preference occu-

216

Newark and Roseland are in Essex County, COAH's Region 2.

217 See generally

U.S.

BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, POPULATION DEMOGRAPHIc REPORT:

MmDLE AmArNIc CENsus DivisioN (1995).
219 See in re Warren, 247 N.J. Super. 146, 168, 588 A.2d 1227, 1238 (1991).
219 See In re Warren II, 132 N.J. 1, 42, 622 A.2d 1257, 1278 (1993).
M See id. Ironically, Roseland's lack of developable land is a result of exclusionary
zoning.
22' See id.
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pancy.m The New Jersey Appellate Division upheld RCAs and concluded that they did not violate Title VIII.Y
The New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, however, erred
when the court confused a prima facie case and compelling government
justifications.'
The Public Advocate in In re Warren established a
prima facie case. Laurel Mount can establish a prima facie case by
showing that Roseland's RCA with Newark has a discriminatory effect.
Laurel Mount can provide statistics that shows that RCAs have a disproportionate effect on a particular minority group and perpetuate segregation.
Roseland's compliance with the spirit and letter of Mount Laurel
was diluted with COAH and NJFHA's assistance. COAH's certification
effectively excluded many units that would have been available. These
units were not built because of the RCA.
In applying the Third Circuit test to establish a Title VIII violation,
Laurel Mount will argue that Roseland's RCA with Newark perpetuates
segregation because the RCA fails to make housing available in Roseland.'
Second, she will need only show discriminatory effect-that isthe RCA had a discriminatory effect based on race. Third, after such a
showing, the burden shifts to Roseland to provide a justification for such
effect. Lastly, Roseland's justification must serve a legitimate bona fide
interest that could not be accomplished through another course of action
that had a less discriminatory effect.
It is not unrealistic to assume that because of the population characteristics and proximity of Newark to Roseland, some of those units would
have gone to minority applicants. Indeed, plaintiff Laurel Mount would
like to live in Roseland. However, the RCA substantially reduced the
number of units available to those of low and moderate incomes like Laurel Mount who cannot find affordable housing in Roseland.

222 See id. COAH's preference occupancy regulation was struck down in In re Warren

//.
223 In re Warren, 247 N.J. Super. at 168, 588 A.2d at 1239.
2

See id. at 168-69, 588 A.2d at 1239. The court concluded that the Public Advocate

failed to establish a prima facie case. The court stated that the prohibition against discrimination in housing had no applicability to RCAs. The appellate court concluded that

many decisions made by government could have an impact on race. The court discussed
decisions made by government that would impact race and not be discriminatory. This
was in error because the court was addressing justification and not the prima facie case.
The appellate division blurred the line. First, plaintiff must establish a prima facie case
and then the burden shifts to the government to show a compelling, legitimate interest.
See Resident Advisory Board v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 149 (3d Cir. 1977).
225 See Rizzo, 564 F.2d at 149. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 3601(a) (1994).
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Such practice violates 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a), because Roseland and
COAH, through the RCA mechanism, make units unavailable in suburban areas. Further, 42 U.S.C. § 3615 states that any law of the state or
subdivision thereof, that purports to permit any action that would be a
discriminatory housing practice shall be invalid. RCAs, a provision in
New Jersey's law, allow a community to commit a discriminatory housing practice-that is-racial segregation.
RCAs allow units that should have been built in the suburbs to be
sent to cities where there is already a large minority population. This
allowance deprives the poor, who are disproportionately minority, of the
opportunities and benefits that a suburb like Roseland has to offer its citizens.
The purpose of Title VIII is to integrate neighborhoods; by contrast,
RCAs discourage and make housing unavailable.'
Additionally, the
units that are available in the suburbs are being occupied by Whites.
In opposition, Roseland and COAH will argue that RCAs further a
legitimate, bona fide interest by rehabilitating substandard housing in
Newark.'
But such interest cannot override a more compelling interest
than racial integration.
Newark, like other major cities, is struggling to revitalize itself.
This paper does not suggest that Newark is not in need of housing but
yet, what types of educational, shopping, recreational, and employment
opportunities does Newark offer its citizens? There are less intrusive
means of accomplishing housing rehabilitation than denying or making
unavailable housing in suburbs where educational, employment, and
other opportunities are better.'
Newark has named itself the "Renaissance City." In the past ten

years, Newark has rebuilt its downtown business area" and, recently,
has begun to demolish old housing projects.

Urban renewal, however,

will only serve to push Newark's minorities into smaller, more insulated
areas in the city.

2 See In re Warren, 247 N.J. Super. at 167, 588 A.2d at 1238 ("Mhe Legislature
included authorization for RCAs in the [NJ]FHA, it must be presumed to have been
aware that such agreements ordinarily would be entered into between suburban municipalities with small minority populations and urban municipalities with substantial minority
populations.").
227 See id. at 169, 588 A.2d at 1239.
m See generally Huntington Branch N.A.A.C.P. v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d
926, 939 (2d Cir. 1988).
29 E.g., The Legal Center, One Newark Center, and Prudential Hall.
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While Newark is experiencing a "renaissance," it is plagued with
the second highest unemployment rate in the country.'
Newark's median household income is 40% below the national average and over 25%
of Newark's residents live below the poverty line.231 Auto insurance
rates in Newark are the highest in the state. 2 In 1995, the State of New
Jersey seized control of Newark's school system because of failing test
scores233 and appalling conditions.'
Recently reported are frightening
statistics that put Newark as the most dangerous city in America.2 35
Newark is not unlike other urban areas. A person is twice as likely
to be a victim of a crime in an urban area than a suburb.
Banks and
supermarkets frequently do not locate in urban neighborhoods.2 37 In New
Jersey, three major cities' school districts have been seized by the state
government.23 Jobs have moved to the suburbs.2 39

2" Salvatore Tuzzeo, New Jersey by the Numbers, N.J. MONTHLY, Jan. 1997, at 42.
Newark's unemployment rate is 14.9%.
"' Carla Fried, America's Safest City: Amherst, N. Y; The Most Dangerous: Newark,
N.J., MONEY MAG., Nov. 27, 1996, at 22.
232 Randy Diamond, More Urban Drivers May Get InsuranceBut Cancellations Would
Increase in Suburbs, THE RECORD, May 14, 1996, at A03.
233 Neal Thompson, Newark Takeover Would Be State's Third, Some Question Benefit
to Largest School District, RECORD, Apr. 15, 1995, at A03. "[Situdents' test scores are
among the state's worst: On the 1994 Early Warning Test for eight-graders, 31.4%
passed, less than half the state average of 70.6 %. And 25% of Newark's high school
students passed the High School Proficiency Test in 1993, compared with 75% statewide." Id.
234 Carule R. Lucas & Angela Stewart, School Inspectors Fan Out Across Newark to
Catalog the Good, Bad, Ugly, STAR-LEDGER, July 19, 1995. "Widespread graffiti, minor
building code violations, rundown bathrooms... damaged ceilings, broken windows ... were among the problems identified." Id.
235 See Fried, supra note 231.
In Newark, roughly "one out of 25 residents was a
victim of a violent crime." In addition, Newark's car theft rate is six times the national
average. However, "Newark has 446 police officers per 100,000 residents- nearly twice
the national average." Id.
236 See Tom Hester, Gun Use Rises as Crime Falls, STAR-LEDGER, July 28, 1995 at 1.
237 See Don Stancavish, Urban Supermarkets in Short Supply, Study Finds Service
Gap, REC. N. N.J., May 17, 1995, at B01 ("Although banks usually receive the harshest
criticism for not serving America's urban neighborhoods ....
millions of Americans pay
more for groceries and have fewer choices among fresh and packaged foods because
large Supermarkets have abandoned many inner-city neighborhoods.").
238 See Takeover -une, STAR-LEDGER, Feb. 11, 1995, at 28.
A Harvard study conducted in 1993 revealed that New Jersey has the fourth highest segregated school system.
More than 50% of Black students in New Jersey attend schools that are more than 90%
non-White. See Nick Chiles, Englewood Clash Involves Education and Race, STARLEDGER, Oct. 29, 1995, at 22.
239 See Lisa Peterson, Jersey Baby Boomers Seek Wide-Open Spaces, STAR-LEDGER,
Jan. 20, 1995, at 1. "The key force is job growth along Interstates 287, 78 and 80." Id.
The U.S. Census indicates that Somerset County had the highest growth. Morris, Warren, Middlesex, Cape May, Atlantic, Bergen, and Passaic counties had some growth but
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NJFHA, through RCAs, falls short of meeting the Mount Laurel
goal-to give the urban poor who are disproportionately Black the chance
for opportunities that the middle class in the suburbs have had since before Mount Laurel I. Cities, because of their zoning, have provided
housing for large number of people, many of whom are poor. Cities,
under the guise of urban renewal, continue to bear the brunt of providing
housing and services to the poor unlike their suburban counterparts who,
because of past zoning practices and RCAs, continue to exclude the poor.
While urban renewal in theory seeks to help the city, in turn helping
its residents, in reality, the poor, often Black and Latino, do not benefit
from urban renewal. RCAs appear to be facially neutral but they actually
bar low to moderate income persons from the suburbs and in so doing
exert a racially disproportionate effect on Blacks and Latinos.
Finally, while this paper's purpose is to show how Title VIII can be
used to strike down RCAs, it would be remiss not to address possible
changes to NJFHA. For example, RCAs should be permitted only if the
sending municipality can prove that there is no available land to build
low to moderate income homes within its borders, and the sending municipality was in no way responsible for such lack of land because of exclusionary zoning practices.
If the municipality is found responsible for the lack of available land
for development, then the municipality must enter into a RCA and must
continue to contribute to the receiving municipality for costs incurred for
low to moderate income housing.'
This would include, among other
things, the costs of municipal services. The rationale behind such a proposal is that cities are already overwhelmed by their share of the poor. If
suburbs, because of their exclusionary zoning practices, have gotten rid
of their burden, then those municipalities must also bear the burden of
supporting the cities where the poor live because the suburbs will not accept them and provide them with affordable housing. This is the constitutional mandate and the law. In conclusion, some twenty years ago, the
New Jersey Supreme Court declared that each of the 567 municipalities
in New Jersey must provide their fair share of low to moderate income
housing. Unfortunately, as seen in the Study, the impact of this decision

at a smaller pace. The third highest growth area was Monmouth and Ocean counties.
That growth, according to Rutgers School of Planning and Public Policy is because of job
opportunities and available housing. Additionally, while other counties remain virtually
flat in population increases, Essex and Hudson counties have experienced a decline. See
id.
24
Additionally, COAH should monitor the funds that are sent to the receiving municipality to ensure that these funds are being used to build and/or rehabilitate housing for
low to moderate income people.
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has not significantly changed the composition of New Jersey neighborhoods.
Instead, in 1997, housing advocates and the like are looking toward
Mount Laurel IV. Perhaps this time, with the use Title VIII, the federal
judiciary will hold that RCAs foster segregation and do not comport with
federal law and the doctrine of Mount Laurel. Finally, RCAs like their
predecessor, exclusionary zoning ordinances, encourage and ratify segregation. This does not promote the general welfare but destroys it.

